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Abstract: 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) has been suspected of carrying out a harmonising agenda 
over and beyond the conventional law-interpreting function of the judiciary. This study aims to investigate 
empirically two theories in relation to the development of EU copyright law: (i) that the Court has failed to 
develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and 
predictability); (ii) that the Court has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological 
interpretation of European law rather than – less discretionary – semantic and systematic legal 
approaches). 
 
We have collected two data sets relating to all ECJ copyright and database cases up to Svensson (February 
2014): (1) Statistics about the allocation of cases to chambers, the composition of chambers, the Judge 
Rapporteur, and Advocate General (including coding of the professional background of the personnel); (2) 
Content analysis of argumentative patterns in the decisions themselves, using a qualitative coding 
technique. Studying the relationship between (1) and (2) allows us to identify links between certain 
Chambers/ Court members and legal approaches, over time, and by subject. These shed light on the internal 
workings of the court, and also enable us to explore theories about the nature of ECJ jurisprudence. 
The analysis shows that private law and in particular intellectual property law expertise is almost entirely 
missing from the Court. However, we find that the Court has developed a mechanism for enabling judicial 
learning through the systematic assignment of cases to certain Judges and AGs. We also find that the Court 
has developed a “fair balance” topos linked to Judge Malenovský (rapporteur on 24 out of 40 copyright 
cases) that does not predict an agenda of upward harmonisation, with about half of judgments narrowing 
rather than widening the scope of copyright protection. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the origin of copyright jurisprudence in the European Union. The role of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (ECJ)1 in shaping this contested, and heavily lobbied field of law is attracting 
considerable attention. There has been a dramatic recent increase in references to the Court, with 6 cases 
filed in the 10 years following the Phil Collins case of 1992, 6 cases in the 5 years between 2002 and 2006, 
and 28 cases between 2007 and 2012. Critiques of this emerging EU copyright jurisprudence range from an 
alleged lack of judicial expertise in a technical and complex area of law to the pursuit of a barely veiled 
harmonising agenda, stepping in where the European legislator failed.2 
The ECJ has been said to interfere with established copyright concepts (for example, now equating “work” 
with “creativity”), and to introduce non-copyright concepts from human rights law, thus removing tools 
from national courts.3 The lack of copyright specific reasoning has been attributed to a ‘lack of experience’4 
as well as to deliberate judicial intervention ‘to achieve a single market’5. Various harmonizing techniques 
have been identified, including (i) rephrasing the referred questions, (ii) assuming the principle of 
autonomous interpretation as a default (forcing uniform EU-wide meaning where it was not intended), and 
(iii) constructing harmonized criteria from international sources.6 In summary, the literature appears to 
suggest that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright jurisprudence; and that the Court is 
pursuing an activist, harmonising agenda. 
This study takes the novel approach that such doctrinal claims about the development of jurisprudence are 
in principle open to empirical investigation. A cursory review of the judgments of the Court immediately 
reveals that copyright decisions were mostly drafted by reporting judges Puissochet (until 2003) and then 
Malenovský (from 2004, often twinned with AGs Sharpston and Trstenjak). All software copyright cases 
were prompted by opinions from AG Bot, and Judge Lenaerts sat on all database right cases (see Appendix I 
for full sample of cases). So an empirical approach to analysing the development of the jurisprudence of the 
Court might start with tracing the background of the judges and advocates general, in order to understand 
whether they have specific competences to address copyright issues. In addition, the Court’s processes, for 
example for allocating cases to chambers, might also offer an empirical window. 
                                                     
1
 Throughout this article we use the abbreviation ECJ (European Court of Justice) to cover the various instantiations 
of the Court, created in in 1952 as the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Communities, then Court of 
Justice of the European Communities, and since 1 December 2009 (when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force) 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (comprising the Court of Justice where all references for a preliminary 
ruling investigated in this study were heard), the General Court (since 1988) and the Civil Service Tribunal (since 
2004). 
2
 Leistner calls this ‘a result of the waning of the political (i.e. legislative) possibilities to achieve a comprehensive 
copyright framework for the use of protected subject matter in the single market, in particular for digital and other 
pan-European networks’. M. Leistner, ‘Europe’s copyright law decade: Recent case law of the European Court of 
Justice and policy perspectives’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 2, 559–600, 599. 
3
 J. Griffiths, ‘Dematerialization, Pragmatism and the European Copyright Revolution’ (2013) 33 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 4, 767-790: ‘The apparent equation of “work” with “creativity” in the Court’s jurisprudence threatens 
the maintenance of the “hybrid” and shifting concept of the “work” that has previously played a role in the law of 
this [UK] jurisdiction in the past. As a consequence, courts in this jurisdiction may have lost an important 
conceptual tool for placing limits on the scope of the powers granted under copyright law.’ Griffiths also argues 
that the Court tends to refer in its rulings to the right to property based on human rights law. See J. Griffith, 
‘Constitutionalising or harmonising? The Court of Justice, the right to property and European copyright law’, (2013) 
38(1) ELR 65-78, 66. 
4
 L. Bently, ‘The return of industrial copyright?’ (2012) 34(10) EIPR 654-672, 663. 
5
 M. Leistner, ‘Europe’s copyright law decade: Recent case law of the European Court of Justice and policy 
perspectives’ (2014) 51 Common Market Law Review 2, 559–600, 598. 
6
 M. van Eechoud, ‘Along the Road to Uniformity – Diverse Readings of the Court of Justice Judgments on Copyright 
Work’ (2012) JIPITEC 1, 83. 
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Our second empirical strategy draws on recent work in the United States that attempts to quantify the 
application of legal factors in judicial opinions through quantitative content analysis.7 In the context of the 
European Court of Justice, this method should allow both the identification of a harmonising agenda (if, for 
example, teleological topoi of reasoning dominate over less discretionary semantic and systematic 
approaches), and may predict outcomes (if more specific patterns that occur in the opinions and decisions 
can be linked to the outcome of each case, for example widening or narrowing the scope of protection).  
From a wider perspective, this study is one of the first empirical attempts to investigate for a specific 
subject domain (copyright and related rights) how a court develops jurisprudence from an indeterminate 
and fragmentary starting point (as European Law has been characterised, for example by Beck and 
Bengoetxea8). The findings therefore may be of wider theoretical interest for explaining the nature of 
transnational jurisprudence. 
The article is structured as follows. We begin by situating our investigation in the intergovernmental and 
neo-functionalist integration theories of political science. We then create a sample of all copyright 
decisions from the first explicit copyright reference in 1992 (Phil Collins)9 to the judgment in Svensson10 a 
case registered in 2012, and delivered on 13 February 2014. This rendered a total of 40 cases filed over a 
period of 20 years that refer to copyright and related rights (including software protection), and 9 database 
right cases. 
The next sections investigate the operations of the Court of Justice, starting with the identification of the 
chambers and of the court members that examine copyright cases. Then, we investigate the biographical 
background of judges and advocates general, and attempt to establish if assignment to copyright cases may 
be linked to expertise. The pattern in the assignment of cases is tested for statistical significance (chi-
square test). 
The second half of the article reports the results of a quantitative content analysis, analysing the reasoning 
of the Court of Justice for the use of semantic, systematic, teleological approaches, and for broad and 
narrow interpretation of concepts. Within the Court’s teleological reasoning we also identify a range of 
arguments: (i) high level of protection for copyright holders, (ii) fair competition, (iii) circulation of culture, 
(iv) fair balance between the rights and interests of authors and the rights of users, (v) harmonization, (vi) 
adequate compensation, (vii) resolving legal uncertainty, (viii) technological development. The use of these 
rhetorical arguments is captured by reporting judge, and linked to the outcome of each case, using 
descriptive statistics (the sample of cases is too small to test for statistical significance). We then evaluate if 
the appearance of certain arguments explains if a judgment results in an outcome ‘pro rightholder’ or not.11 
The final section discusses the implications of our empirical findings for generalised claims about the nature 
of the ECJ’s jurisprudence, in particular the alleged failure to develop coherent, copyright specific reasoning 
under a teleological interpretation of European Law. A better empirical understanding of how European 
jurisprudence is created and shaped will also contribute to identifying dysfunctions that need to be 
                                                     
7
 B. Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions’, (2008) 156 Pennsylvania Law Review 549; B. 
Beebe, ‘An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement’, (2006) 95 California Law Review 
1581; M. Sag, ‘Predicting Fair Use’ (2012) 73(1) Ohio State Law Journal 47-91. 
3
 J. Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice: Towards a European Jurisprudence 
(Oxford/New York: Clarendon 1993); G. Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice of the EU (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing 2012). The ambiguity of European law is produced by the nature of the legal instrument at hand 
(directives often provide frameworks rather than defined norms) and by the multicultural nature of European 
legislators. 
9
 C-92/92 - Collins et Patricia Im- und Export / Imtrat et EMI Electrola [1993] I-05145 (whether the general principle 
of non-discrimination laid down in the EC Treaty applies to copyright and related rights). 
10
 C-466/12 - Svensson (ECLI:EU:C:2014:76) (whether hyperlinking constitutes an act of communication to the public). 
11
  Please note that an activist, harmonising agenda is not equated with either a broad or narrow construction of the 
key concept, nor an expansionist outcome (favouring rightholders). Incoherence and expansionism are tested 
separately. As we shall see, the same argument (high protection for the author) and the same approach 
(teleological) on the same concept (communication to the public from the InfoSoc directive 2001/29/EC) can lead 
to opposite outcomes (e.g. in the cases of OSA C-351/12 and Svensson C-466/12). 
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addressed by prospective institutional reforms. The introduction of specialised (intellectual property) 
professionals within the European Court system is suggested as a possible solution.  
 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
It is almost trite to assert the pervasive influence of the European Court of Justice on all fields of European 
Law. Whether contained12 and prudent13 or innovative and activist,14 justice dispensed by the European 
Court ‘elicits compliance and bolsters its authority’.15 Two integration theories dominate the field of 
European political science: intergovernmental and neo-functionalist. According to the first, policy-making at 
the EU level is the exclusive domain of Member States which elaborate policies at intergovernmental level. 
Conversely, the latter theory argues that the difficulty in reaching consensus among EU Members prompts 
a ‘judicialisation’ of the EU governance, whereby the Court sets legal principles that induce policy reforms, 
which in turn underpin further European jurisprudence, in a virtuous circle.16 These arguments are 
inscribed in the broader debate on the normative function of the Court, instrumental to European 
integration, discussed already by early commentators of European law.17 
Member States seem to accept the jurisprudence of the Court, willingly18 or unwillingly,19 because on the 
one hand overturning its ruling requires a modification of the Treaties20 and on the other hand the Court 
                                                     
12
 L. Conant, Justice Contained. Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 2002), 7-
10. See C. Carrubba, M. Gabel, and C. Hankla, ‘Judicial Behaviour under Political Constraints: Evidence from the 
European Court of Justice’ (2008) 102(4) American Political Science Review 435-452, 450. 
13
 U. Everling, ‘The Member States of the European Community before their Court of Justice’, (1984) 9 ELR 215-241. 
A. Bredimas, Methods of interpretation and Community Law (Oxford: North-Holland 1978), 145. For an 
examination of ECJ rulings in which the Court adjusts to the will of political institutions see V. Hatzopoulos, 
‘Actively talking to each other: the Court and the political institutions’, in E. Muir, M. Dawson and B. de Witte (eds) 
Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenam: Edward Elgar 2013), 133. 
14
 See generally A. Stone Sweet and T. L. Brunell, ‘How the European Legal System Works: Override, Non-Compliance, 
and Majoritarian Activism in International Regimes’ (SSRN 8 March 2011) at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1780902 
(last visited 13 March 2014). Seealsogenerally the first worksuggesting ECJ activism: J .P. Colin, Le gouvernement 
des juges dans les Communautés Européennes (Paris: M. Pinchon et R. Durand-Auzias 1965). Also generally H. 
Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Copenhagen: MartinusNijhoff 1986) and H. 
Rasmussen, ‘Between Activism and Self-Restraint: a judicial Policy for the European Court’ (1988) 13 ELR 28-39, 34. 
For a recent work indicating the limits of the teleological approach of the Court see generally G. Conway, The 
Limits of Legal Reasoning and the European Court of Justice (Cambridge: CUP 2014). The author argues that the 
Court’s departure from most common interpretative approaches, eg the three-stage theory by McCormick D.N. 
and Summers R. in Interpreting Statutes: a Comparative Study (Dartmouth: Aldershot 1991) is not justifiable by the 
originality of the EU scenario, and it suggests methods of adaptation of traditional interpretative techniques to the 
ECJ case-law. See also E. Stein, ‘Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution’ (1981) 75(1) 
American Journal of International Law 1-27, 25, arguing that the court (namely its judges and AGs) in accord with 
the Commission create a constitution for Europe. 
15
 Conant n 12 above, 39. 
16
 A. Stone Sweet, ‘The European Court of Justice and the judicialization of EU governance’, (2010) 5(2) Living 
Reviews in European Governance, 7. However, others argue that the ECJ judges are sensitive to policy constraints 
from Member States. This thesis has been empirically demonstrated by Carrubba et al. n 12 above.  
17
 R. Dehousse, La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes (Paris: Montchrestien 1997), 72. 
18
 J. Weiler, ‘A Quiet Revolution: The European Court of Justice and its Interlocutors’, (1994) Comparative Political 
Studies 510-534, 534. The author argues however that the conditions favouring this ‘easy’ acceptance of ECJ 
jurisprudence are changing, and the future might bring less easy compliance with the European judicial norms. See 
also Stone Sweet n 14 above, 69, arguing that the Court does so by implementing a ‘majoritarian activism’. 
19
 Weileribid, 530. The Court can achieve this result thanks to ‘prudent’ legal interpretation of EU law, which are not 
openly in contrast to member states policy and are likely to be accepted by national judiciaries.  
20
 Stone Sweet and Brunell n 14 above, 69. 
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enjoys support by legal and political mobilization of interested parties.21 However, it has been suggested 
that the Court is adopting approaches that contain its potential over-expansion.22 
ECJ commentators are also divided between those claiming that the Court represents the interest of the 
most powerful EU Member States (the Principal-Agent theory)23 and others claiming that the Court, as 
many international courts, is impartial, independent, and conscious of its reputation and mandate (Trustee 
rather than Agent).24 Although not immune from policy influence and pressure, the ECJ often produces 
outcomes unexpected, and uncontrolled by Member States.25  It needs to be noted however that 
throughout history, according to the above literature, the Court alternated bold legal innovation with 
conservative and cautious interpretation of EU law.26 This is true both thematically and chronologically.27 In 
other words, the degree of innovation introduced by the ECJ judgments varies across time and areas of law. 
These theories, albeit to a different extent, acknowledge that the Court triggers significant changes to EU 
policies, thanks to interventionist legal interpretations.28 Moreover, the Court’s remit witnessed a gradual 
expansion, including jurisdiction on highly technical subject-matters (for example, competition law, 
constitutional law, labour law, etc.) without a corresponding specialisation of the Court’s chambers or 
judges, hence raising concerns about its credibility.29 In the field of copyright, for example, some suggest 
that the rulings of the Court step in where European law leaves gaps and loopholes, and that they appear 
to be motivated by a harmonising agenda which overshadow rigorous subject-specific reasoning. It has also 
been argued that the Court builds up its own concepts of copyright law (for example the concept of ‘new 
public’ in relation to the right to communication to the public) in order to advance a harmonising or 
political agenda.30 
In sum, thanks to the indeterminacy of European law, legal interpretation in the hands of the European 
judiciary transcends its traditional function. Unlike in most legal system, European law does not provide in 
its texts the criteria to interpret its own legislation and norms. Directions on how the acquis 
                                                     
21
 Conant n 12 above, 38. See also generally R. Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, 
Mobilization and Governance (Cambridge: CUP 2007). 
22
 J. Bell, ‘The Role of European Judges in an Era of Uncertainty’, in P. Birkinshaw and M. Varney (eds) The European 
Legal Order after Lisbon (Austin, Boston, Chicago, New York, The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International 2010), 
289. See also F. G. Jacobs, ‘The Court of Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges Ahead for the Judicial 
System?’, in A. Rosas, A. Levits, E. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe (ebook: Asser Press 
Springer 2013), 56, advocating self-restraint of the Court when supporting the ‘green light’ theory. See also 
Dehousse n 17 above, 16-17, arguing in essence that the Court uses its ‘policy-making’ powers with discretion. 
23
 See generally G. Garrett, ‘ The Policy of Legal integration in the European Union’ (1995]) 49(1) International 
Organizations, 171-181, and G. Garrett, R. D. Kelemen, and generally H. Schulz, ‘The European Court of Justice, 
national governments and Legal Integration in the European Union’, (1998) 52(1) International Organizations 149-
176. 
24
 A. Stone Sweet and T. L. Brunell , ‘Trustee Courts and the Judicialization of International Regimes: The Politics of 
Majoritarian Activism in the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Union, and the World Trade 
Organization’ (2013) 1(1) Journal of Law and Courts 61-88, 64.  
25
 K. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power (Oxford: OUP 2009), 237. 
26
 C. Kaupa, ‘Maybe not activist enough? On the court’s alleged neoliberal bias in its recent labour cases’, in Muir, 
Dawson and de Witte (eds) Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013), 74. 
27
 Commentators suggest that while the Court was innovative in areas where it could count on larger mobilization of 
juridical and political activism, it was more cautious on delicate areas where countries strongly claim their national 
supremacy. See Dehousse n 17 above, 144, arguing that the Court adopted a lower profile since the end of the 
‘80s, due to a strain on integration impulses. See also Conant n 12 above, 38 for the role of activist mobilization; 
and on the same topic Alter, n 25 above, 63. 
28
 Alter ibid, 47. The author cites the liberalisation of telecommunications as an example. 
29
 J. Weiler, ‘Epilogue: The Judicial Après Nice’, in G. De Bùrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) The European Court of Justice 
(Oxford: OUP 2001), 221. C. Kaupa, ‘Maybe not activist enough? On the court’s alleged neoliberal bias in its recent 
labour cases’, in Muir, Dawson and de Witte (eds) Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar 2013), 74. 
30
 Griffiths; van Eechoud; Leistner, n 3 above. On the same point related to general EU Law see Stone Sweet and 
Brunell n 14 above, 68. 
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communautaire has to be construed will be drawn therefore from the jurisprudence of the Court, both 
from its express guidance on interpretation and from its most current practice. An example of specific 
guidelines issued by the Court is provided by the landmark case CILIFT31, where the Court stated several 
principles: first, that Community legislation is drafted in several languages, all of which are authentic and 
which have to be compared; secondly, that Community law has its peculiar terminology; thirdly, that 
provisions of European law need to be put in context and interpreted according to the purpose of 
community law as a whole.32 
Common interpretative practices of the Court as reported by the literature involve the use of traditional 
interpretative approaches, generally classified as semantic/semiotic, contextual/systematic and 
teleological/dynamic, with the addition of peculiar canons specific to the EU (effet utile, proportionality 
principle, uniform application, etc.). While some studies on European jurisprudence detect an arbitrary 
imbalance in the weight assigned to such topoi, with a favour for teleological canons instead of semantic 
interpretations,33 other researchers provide a different picture. Bengoetxea and Beck for example, in their 
respective works, affirm that semantic arguments are preferred by the Court whenever the text of the law 
is clear, detailed, and univocal (especially in different translations). If the Court appears to give to semantic 
arguments less weight than most high courts, it is because of the inherent ambiguity of European law.34 
In sum, problematic issues identified in the literature regarding the approach of the ECJ in interpreting and 
applying European law are: a) the Court is said to over-use teleological interpretation in order to carry out 
its harmonising agenda; b) the rulings of the Court do not reveal a consistent and foreseeable pattern, 
apart from the consolidation of European law; c) the above issues are particularly evident in subject-
specific areas, where the Court relinquish specialist doctrine in favour of a European agenda. 
However, these assumptions have not been explored empirically, a gap that the present study will address 
in one specific subject domain. 
 
  
                                                     
31
 Case 283/81 CILIFT [1982] ECR 3415 (17-20). 
32
 See A. Arnull, The European Union and its Court of Justice (Oxford: OUP 2006), 608. Also Bengoetxea n 8 above, 
232. 
33
 See for example Griffiths; van Eechoud; Leistner, n 3 above. 
33
 See Beck n 8 above, 190. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Previous empirical research on the ECJ has used both qualitative and quantitative methods to explore the 
influence of the Court on EU policy-making. These studies are based either on a chronological selection of 
cases35 or on a thematic selection36. Mostly, these studies examined the impact of the observations of 
Member States and EU institutions (e.g. the EU Commission) on the opinions of the Advocate General and 
on the judgment.  
Other jurisprudential research examines the decision-making process of the Court37 by analysing a number 
of judicial decisions as case studies, in search of specific patterns in the Court’s approaches.  
With a focus on copyright case-law, our study aims to provide empirical evidence on the claims that the 
Court is pursuing an interventionist agenda by analysing the complete set of judgments in one specific 
technical subject domain where the pattern (according to theory) should be particularly apparent (e.g. 
through inconsistent, unpredictable reasoning and expansionist outcomes).  
Our sample is defined by all cases decided as of February 2014 that are the result of preliminary references 
to the Court which refer in the Application and in the Ground of Judgment to one of the directives of the 
acquis communautaire on the subject-matter of copyright and related rights, or the database right. The 
focus is solely on preliminary references38, and the time frame ranges from the first copyright case of Phil 
Collins (registered in 1992 and delivered on 20 October 1993) to Svensson (registered in 2012 and delivered 
on 13 February 2014). These criteria render 49 cases, of which 40 cases refer to copyright, related rights 
and software protection,39 and 9 cases relate to the database right.40 The documents analysed consist of 
                                                     
35
 Carrubba et al. n 12 above. 
36
 A. Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford: OUP 2004). R. Cichowski,.‘Integrating the 
Environment: The European Court and the Construction of Supranational Policy’ (1998) 5(3) Journal of European 
Public Policy 387-405. R. Cichowski, ‘Women’s Rights, the European Court, and Supranational Constitutionalism’ 
(2004) 38(3) Law and Society Review 489-512. R. Cichowski, The European Court and Civil Society: Litigation, 
Mobilization and Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007). M. McCown, ‘The European 
Parliament before the Bench: ECJ precedent and European Parliament Litigation Strategies’ (2003) 10(6) Journal of 
European Public Policy 974-995. S. Nyikos, ‘The Preliminary Reference Process: National Court Implementation, 
Changing Opportunity Structures and Litigant Desistment’ (2003) 4(4) European Union Politics 397-419.  
37
 J. Bengoetxea, N. McCormick and L. Moral Soriano, ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal Reasoning of the 
European Court of Justice’, in G. De Bùrca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) The European Court of Justice (Oxford: OUP 
2001), 43. 
38
 The procedure for a preliminary ruling is prompted by a reference from a national court of a EU Member State, 
requiring the interpretation of a point of European Law, which might indirectly involve the infringement of EU law 
by the Member State. For direct infringement, Breach Proceedings can be brought by the Commission against the 
allegedly infringing Member State, but these have not contributed to the development of copyright jurisprudence. 
Breach Procedures also present a different decision structure and would not be codable by the categories we 
employ for statistical analysis (for example, outcome of the case classified as ‘rightholder wins = 1; rightholder 
loses = 0’). Breech Procedures remain outside the scope of this study. Since the ECJ does not have any influence 
over preliminary references from courts in Member States, there are no ‘selection effects’, e.g. that the Court may 
have admitted cases for certain reasons. 
39
 Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society, OJ L 167, 22.06.2001 P. 10 – 19; Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 
1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property, 
OJ L 346, 27.11.1992, p. 61–66. Directive 92/100/EEC has been repealed and replaced by Directive 2006/115/EC, 
withoutprejudice to the obligations of the Member States relating to the time-limits for transposition into national 
law of the Directives; Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, 
OJ L 248, 6.10.1993, p. 15–21; Directive 2001/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
September 2001 on the resale right for the benefit of the author of an original work of art, OJ L 272, 13.10.2001, p. 
32–36; Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonizing the term of protection of copyright and 
certain related rights, OJ L 290, 24.11.1993, p. 9–13. Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, OJ L 372, 
27.12.2006, p. 12-18; Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on 
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the Opinions of the Advocate General (AG) and the Grounds for Judgment (including the Operational Part 
of the Judgment) of each case.  
Our first methodological approach investigates the workings of the Court by tracking down the route of 
specialist subject-matter within the Court (descriptive statistics of case assignment, chambers, AGs and 
judges). Subsequently the legal background of the members of the European Court of Justice is mapped in 
search of relationships between subject-specific expertise and the assignment of cases. The second method 
applies systematic content analysis41 to capture the recourse to certain legal approaches in the text of the 
sampled cases, which are coded in variables that can in turn be subjected to statistical computation and 
analysis. The dependent variable is represented by the outcome of the case (the impact on the rights of the 
copyright owner) and the explanatory variables are represented by the legal approaches implemented by 
the Court. Finally, the identified legal approaches are linked to individual court members and subject sub-
areas (database, software), in order to identify possible causal relationships. The aim is not an assessment 
of the substantive law, but rather an identification of predominant legal interpretative approaches within 
the Court and their impact on the decision-making process.  
The coding required a technical understanding of both EU and copyright law, and was carried out by one of 
the authors, not a research assistant. Pilot codings were jointly reviewed, and problematic instances were 
discussed throughout the process between the authors to increase reliability.42  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
certain permitted uses of orphan works OJ L 299, 27.10.2012, p. 5-12; Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 
1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 122, 17.05.1991 p. 42 – 46. Directive 2009/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, OJ L 111, 
05.05.2009, p. 16 -22; Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 1998 on 
the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access, OJ L 320, 1998-11-28, pp. 54–57; 
Directives on the protection of semiconductor topographies (87/54/EC, 94/824/EC, 96/644/EC); Directive 
2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights OJ L 195/16, 02.06.2004, p. 16-25.  
40
  Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of 
databases OJ L 077, 27/03/1996 P. 0020 – 0028. 
41
  M. A. Hall and R. F. Wright, ‘Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions’, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 63 (2008); Fred Kort, 
‘Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions and Rules of Law’, in Judicial Decision-making 133 (Glendon Schubert, ed. 
1963); R. C. Lawlor, ‘Fact Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions’, 8 Jurimetrics J. 107, 110 (1968); B. Beebe, ‘An 
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions’, (2008) 156 Pennsylvania Law Review 549; B. Beebe, ‘An 
Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement’, (2006) 95 California Law Review 1581; M. 
Sag, ‘Predicting Fair Use’ (2012) 73(1) Ohio State Law Journal 47-91. 
42
  For transparency, coding was recorded in a Codebook which will be made available online on the website of the 
CREATe centre. 
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EMPIRICAL STUDY I: THE COURT AT WORK (PROCESSES AND BIOGRAPHIES) 
Assignment of Copyright cases 
The sample analysed by our study includes all closed cases up to Svensson (February 2014) referring to one 
of the directives forming the acquis communautaire relating to copyright.43 Since the ECJ does not have 
specialised sections, in practice the President of the Court, after the preliminary report of the Reporting 
Judge, allocates the case to a chamber. The criteria for this assignment are unclear, as they are not 
provided by the rules of procedure of the Court.44 
Before the year 199845 preliminary rulings were not assigned to chambers. Thereafter, the data reveals a 
predominance of the Third Chamber of the Court, followed by cases assigned to the Fourth and Grand 
Chamber. Controlling for the number of cases in total to each Chamber, the picture remains stable. 
 
Figure 1 – Portion of copyright cases assigned to each Chamber (post-1998) 
  
                                                     
43
 n39 above. 
44
 Article 60 Rules of Proceedings of the ECJ: ‘Assignment of cases to formations of the Court:  
 1. The Court shall assign to the Chambers of five and of three Judges any case brought before it in so far as the 
difficulty or importance of the case or particular circumstances are not such as to require that it should be assigned 
to the Grand Chamber, unless a Member State or an institution of the European Union participating in the 
proceedings has requested that the case be assigned to the Grand Chamber, pursuant to the third paragraph of 
Article 16 of the Statute.  
 2. The Court shall sit as a full Court where cases are brought before it pursuant to the provisions referred to in the 
fourth paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute. It may assign a case to the full Court where, in accordance with the 
fifth paragraph of Article 16 of the Statute, it considers that the case is of exceptional importance.’ See the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court Of Justice, L 265/1 Official Journal of the European Union, 29.9.2012, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:265:0001:0042:EN:PDF 
45
 In our sample, all cases in chronological order are assigned to the Court in Plenary formation up to C-60/98 Scarlet 
Extended [2011] ECR I-11959). The following cases lodged from 1998, starting with C-293/98- Egeda 
(ECLI:EU:C:2012:85), were assigned to the Court in Chamber formation.  
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When these figures are broken down by year of registration, the data show a steady raise of assignments to 
the Third Chamber, with the Fourth Chamber taking over in 2011. 
 
Figure 1 – Assignment of copyright cases to Chamber by year 
 
We applied a chi-square test to this data to establish if it was statistically possible that the assignment of 
cases was random. The test resulted in a p-value of 0.13702, meaning that there is an approximately 1.37% 
chance that the patterns of assignment are not the result of an external influence.46 
The review of case allocation among chambers of the ECJ prompted an investigation of the identity of the 
judges sitting on the panels, in order to understand whether the choice of the chamber might correspond 
to the choice of a judge. The data show nine judges representing more than 80 per cent of the total 
presences in Court when ruling on copyright cases. These judges are mostly part of the third and the fourth 
chambers of the ECJ. This suggests that the chambers were chosen on the basis of the composition of the 
panel, presumably because of a particular expertise in the subject-specific area.   
A substantial share of cases however were referred to the Grand Chamber, which is called into action 
whenever a case is particularly complex and of potentially wider significance. Our analysis needs to take 
into account the specific procedural rules according to which the Grand Chamber is formed. Panellists of 
Grand Chambers for example have to include the presidents of the other Chambers, irrespective of their 
background or experience. Accounting for the potential distorting effects produced by these procedural 
rules the data still appear to indicate a deliberate selection of judges in both Court formations (Grand 
Chamber or other Chamber). 
Further, the recurrence of Reporting Judges and of Advocates General (AGs) has also been calculated. 
Judge J. Malenovský registers an overwhelming majority of presences as Judge Rapporteur in the cases in 
the sample, followed at a large distance by Judge G. Arestis, and by Judge K. Lenaerts. 
Moreover, a subject-matter specific analysis reveals that Judge Malenovský is the reporting judge in most 
cases on copyright and related rights since the year of his appointment (2004), whereas before this date 
this role was covered by Judge Puissochet. For database rights, Judge Lenaerts is the Reporting Judge in 
                                                     
46
 Statistical significance at the 5% level (i.e. a p-value of .05) is considered high. At the 1% level (p-value of .01), the 
null hypothesis (that the cases are randomly distributed) can be ruled out. 
0
1
2
0 0
2
3
11
0 00
2
4
6
8
10
12
1992-2000 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
GRAND
SECOND
THIRD
FOURTH
SIXTH
12 
 
almost all cases. Only three cases of our sample related to software protection. Two of them were assigned 
to Judge Arestis. A clear relationship therefore seems to emerge between specific judges and specific sub-
areas of copyright law. However, since the year 2011 copyright cases tend to be assigned to members of 
the fourth chamber other than Malenovský. A possible explanation for this apparent change of policy could 
be the remarkable increase in the copyright-related workload of the Court. 
 
Figure 3– Cases by Reporting Judge and subject matter 
 
Running the chi-square test on the assignment of cases to individual reporting judges, the statistical 
findings (unsurprisingly) are striking. The results are significant at a p-value of 0.000713, that is there is a 
probability below 0.1 per cent that the assignments are not the result of external factors (such as deliberate 
choices). 
The analysis yields less extreme results with relation to the presence of specific Advocates General in the 
examined case-law. However, a pattern emerges also here. In the area of copyright law, two AGs show a 
number of presences notably higher to that of others: V. Trstenjak and E. Sharpston. In the area of 
software, although the size of the sample is small, AG Bot is assigned to all three cases. Finally, in the area 
of the database right, despite an apparent prevalence of AG Stix-Hackl, the distribution among AGs is more 
balanced.47 
                                                     
47
 AG Stix-Hackl in fact appears to have the highest share of cases but this is a false positive, as the four cases assigned 
to her are in fact four parallel cases regarding the same factual situation (C-444/02 Fixtures Marketing [2004] ECR 
I-10549, C-338/02 Fixtures Marketing [2004] ECR I-10497, C-203/02 The British Horseracing Board [2004] ECR I-
10415, C-46/02 Fixtures Marketing [2004] ECR I-10365). 
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Figure 4 – Cases by Advocates General and subject matter 
  
Appendix 1 of this article shows the complete sample of cases, categorised by parties, year, chambers, AG 
and reporting judge. 
The data above show a statistically significant dominance of specific members of the ECJ in copyright and 
database cases, in what appears to reflect a traditional unwritten operational code of the Court, which 
tends to assign cases by subject matter, enabling the development of specific expertise. 48 Judge 
Malenowsky clearly prevails in the assignment of copyright cases, while database cases are assigned to 
Judge Lenaertz. Malenovský has a background in European Law, without a specialisation in Intellectual 
Property Law. His experience in copyright matters seems to derive from the practice before the Court. This 
is in line with the tradition of the Court. Members have a generalist background, because they are expected 
to examine a wide array of subject-matter.49 
A cross comparison between chamber assignment and member assignment confirms the above 
observations. Copyright cases assigned to the Fourth Chamber coincide with cases assigned to Judge 
Malenovský, who was assigned to both the Third and the Fourth Chambers. After Malenovský, a much 
lower recurrence of presences can be registered by Judges Arestis and Lenaerts, also from the Third and 
Fourth Chamber, more often though sitting when the Court was in Grand Chamber formation. A marginal 
share of copyright cases is assigned to the Second, Fifth and Sixth Chamber. As noted in section 1, it was in 
one of these cases that the composition of the Court (and its ‘lack of experience’) has been severely 
criticised.50 
 
  
                                                     
48
 This observation was first made with reference to a first-generation of intellectual property cases before the Court 
that show a prevalence of Advocate General Francis Jacobs and Reporting Judge Claus Christian Gulmann (who in 
turn was previously Advocate General before the Court). See N. Burrows and R. Greaves, The Advocate General 
and EC Law (Oxford: OUP 2007), 128. 
49
 ibid, 297. 
50
 L. Bently, ‘The return of industrial copyright?’ (2012) 34(10) EIPR654-672, 663. 
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The members of the ECJ 
Having identified a pattern of case assignment that must be deliberate, we now examine if there is specific 
subject expertise revealed by the background of those judges that appear to be shaping the development 
of EU copyright jurisprudence. 
Members of the European Court of Justice (judges and Advocates General), according to European Law, 
must be appointed by a ‘common accord of the governments of Member States’.51 However, since its 
inception the practice of the recruitment of the Court involved individual Member States appointing ‘their’ 
judges without any interference from the others.52 Necessary experience and qualifications for the 
appointment of a member to the Court of Justice of the European Union (including all courts) are only 
broadly specified.   
Article 253 of the Treaty of the European Union provides that candidates to the European Court of Justice 
should be ‘persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisprudents of 
recognised competence’.53 
However, according to the Judges’ Charter in Europe (1993) of the European Association of Judges, the 
selection of the judges should be based ‘on objective criteria designed to ensure professional competence. 
Selection must be performed by an independent body which represents the Judges. No outside influence 
and, in particular, no political influence must play any part in the appointment of Judges’.54 
The procedure of appointment of the members of the Court, therefore, departs from the most common 
procedures implemented in national jurisdictions, which are based either on a public competition, under 
the supervision of a magistracy body, or on public elections. This peculiar procedure for the appointment of 
European judges inspired concerns relating to the independence of the Court.55 In fact, the first historic 
accounts of the ECJ composition report that no judge or advocate general was appointed to the Court 
without being very close to the political establishment that selected him56 (or her, although we have to wait 
till 1990 to see the first female judge of the Court57). Moreover, despite concerns, court members are 
appointed for six years, and their mandate is freely renewable by Member States.58 This represents an 
obvious tool of pressure on the judge by the Member State, which is only partially balanced by the 
procedure providing for collegial decisions and confidentiality of dissenting opinions.59 
                                                     
51
 Lisbon Treaty, Article 19 available http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf (last 
accessed 28 June 2015). 
52
 F. G. Jacobs, ‘The Court of Justice in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges Ahead for the judicial System?’, in A. 
Rosas, E. Levits, Y. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe (eBook: Asser Press Springer 2013), 
58. See also Dehousse n 17 above, 12. 
53
 The text of the Treaty (Consolidated version of the Treaty of the European Union) is available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf (last accessed 28 June 2015).  
54
 Available online at http://www.richtervereinigung.at/international/eurojus1/eurojus15a.htm (last accessed 23 
October 2013). 
55
 See Rasmussen n 14above, 34. 
56
 See generally Nicole Condorelli Braun, Commissaires et juges dans le communeautés européennes (Paris: Pichon et 
Durand-Auzias 1972). This finding was confirmed by later research. See Dehousse n 17 above, 12.  
57
 This was Fidelma O’ Kelly Macken, althought Simone Rozès had already been appointed as Advocate General in 
1981. See D. Tamm,' The History of the court of Justice of the European Union since its Origin', in A. Rosas, Levits, 
E. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe (eBook: Asser Press Springer 2013)Error! 
Reference source not found., 20. 
58
 The European Parliament proposal to extend the mandate of the judges to 10 years, not renewable, was rejected. 
Some commentators suggest that this is a clear sign that Member States do not intend to renounce their power of 
pressure on the Members of the Court. See Dehousse n 17 above, 18; Weiler n 29 above at 225; and Arnull n 32 
above, at 22. 
59
 Dehousse n 17 above, 15. Minority opinions in fact are not published in judgments, in order to preserve the 
independence of the judge, especially vis-à-vis the member state that has appointed them. Arnull 2006 n 32 above, 
11. 
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The gradual expansion of the Court, both in terms of members and competences, fuelled the debate 
around its judicial independence, hence calling for reform of the appointment process. A special committee 
was created by the Article 255 of the Lisbon Treaty (2009).60 This panel of seven members, appointed by 
the Council for four years, is formed by former members of the ECJ, juridical figures of the highest quality, 
and one member proposed by the EU Parliament. The committee examines the candidatures of new 
members as well as membership renewals, and issues a non-binding confidential opinion to the appointing 
Member State.61 Effects of the activity of this committee on the independence of court members would 
need to be assessed by further research, in due course.62 Meanwhile, critics of this institution suggest that 
improvements should be made in order to enhance the impact of the committee on the impartiality of the 
judges.63 
The professional background of the members of the European Court of Justice has been object of a limited 
body of research.64 More recently, Antonin Cohen65 and Sally Kenney66 have examined the background of 
the members of the Court with a focus on their professional experience and background, as well as their 
career provenance.67 All the above studies present a scenario with court member that are mainly 
academics in the area of community, comparative or international law, often in addition to being high 
members of the judiciary and high officials (or consultants) in their respective governments.  
We analysed the profile of all 45 members of the ECJ who sat on our sample of copyright cases, including 
those decided in the Grand Chamber, out of a total of 94 Members sitting in the Court during the period 
examined. 
Our analysis shows a remarkable prevalence of EU Law and Public Law in the professional background of 
the members of the Court. A large majority has performed studies or held academic positions in the fields 
of: European Union (or Community) Law, Public Administration Law, Public International Law, or Public 
European Law. A background in Constitutional Law and Human Rights is also relatively common among ECJ 
members, also because many join from a post in their national Constitutional Court or on the European 
Court of Human Rights.68 Minority specialisations, in relative terms, include Civil Law, Criminal Law, Political 
Science, and Trade Law, followed by International Private Law (Conflict of Laws), Comparative Law, and Law 
and Economics. The smallest percentage in turn is represented by specialists in Family Law, Tax Law, 
Competition Law, and Business Law.  
 
                                                     
60
 Text of the Treaty (consolidated) at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st06/st06655-re07.en08.pdf. 
61
 The committee is referred in practice as ‘le comité 255’. See generally J.M. Sauvé, ‘Le role du comité 255 dans la 
sélection du Juge de l’Union’, in Rosas, A. Levits, E. Bot (eds) The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe 
(eBook: Asser Press Springer 2013).  
62
 The committee has been active since the year 2010. 
63
 Arnull for example suggests that the ‘committee 255’ could choose from a list of three candidates, as it is currently 
done for the appointment of ECHR judges. See Arnull n 32 above at 25. In fact, many of the problems that have 
been identified regarding the appointment process of judges at the ECHR are applicable to ECJ judges as well. See 
Interight Report ‘Judicial Independence: Law and Practice of appointments to the ECHR’, available at 
http://www.interights.org/jud-ind-en/index.html (last accessed 6 March 2015). 
64
 Nicole Condorelli Braun carried out one of the first analyses of the background of the members of the Court from 
its establishment until the beginning of 1970. She explored in detail the biography of the (then) few judges of the 
European Court and reported anecdotal evidence of their political connections as well as their recruitment. 
Condorelli Braun n 56 above. 
65
 A. Cohen, ‘Sous la robe du juge: le recrutement social de la Cour’, in Pascal Mbongo and Antoine Vauchez (eds) 
Dans la fabrique du droit européen. Scènes, acteurs et publics de la Cour de justice des Communeautés 
européennes (Bruylant 2009). See also Antonin Cohen, ‘The Legal Community: Judges, Lawyers, Officials and Clerks 
in the Writing of Europe’, European University Institute Working Papers, at 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/10029 (last accessed 6 March 2015). 
66
 See generally S. Kenney, ‘The members of the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, (1998) 5 Columbia 
Journal of European Law 101-133 
67
 ibid, 107. 
68
 See below, in the same section. 
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Figure 5 – Main background of Members by specialist area of law 
 
Most of the ECJ members, as expected, have composite careers, featuring academic positions alongside 
juridical professions and governmental posts. We have stratified the sample in four main profiles, which 
seem to remain the leading careers of the members of the European Court since its inception:69 a) 
Academics; b) Judiciary; c) Lawyers (including public prosecutors); d) Public Administration (including 
consultancy appointments). First we have calculated the recurrence of each of the above profiles in the 
career of each member, therefore including several profiles in each career. Secondly we have attempted to 
identify the prevailing profile in each career, in order to compute each member for his main professional 
background. We also have considered the economic expertise of each member70, and their provenance 
from another international or European institution71. 
The analysis indicates that the majority of ECJ members have held academic posts at some stage in their 
career. Most of these members are university professors, but some are part-time lecturer or researchers in 
addition to their main (non-academic) career. The majority of the members have also held posts within 
their home public administration, often as a consultant of the government, but mainly as a civil servant for 
a ministry or public institution. A similar share of the sample has occupied a post in another international 
institution before being appointed to the Court. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) seems to be 
the largest feeder of members to the ECJ. However, a considerable share of members comes from the 
Court itself, as previous judges of the General Court, or legal clerks (référendaires) at the ECJ or as Advocate 
General. Other members join from EU institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament), or from 
delegations to the EU institutions, or from advisory bodies to the EU institutions. One member comes from 
a European agency (Europol).  
                                                     
69
 Previous literature did not analyse separately the skills of the members. However, the comparison with their 
findings relating to the main career of each member reveals by and large the same proportions among the Court’s 
main profiles (academics, judges and administrators). See Cohen n 65 above, 22-23 and Kelley n 66 above, 107. 
70
 In addition to an expertise in Law and Economics, indicated in the previous paragraph, the data revealed the 
presence of an economic component in the examined curricula, in the form of other academic qualifications or 
professional experiences. 
71
 Data on the background of the Court Members was mainly sourced on the website of the Court 
(http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026/), with the addition of internet searches, where possible. 
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More than half of the examined members of the Court of Justice had served at some point of their career in 
their national judiciary, often at the highest level (Constitutional Court, Highest Court, or Administrative 
Highest Court). Only seven per cent have worked in legal practice, either in ordinary courts or 
administrative tribunals.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 – Provenance of Court Members sitting on copyright cases 
 
The examination of the main careers of the members suggests a balance between Judiciary, Academe and 
Public Administration, with a moderate prevalence of the latter. Only a minority has been shaped by legal 
practice. It is interesting to note that a sizeable share of the sample has some background or experience in 
33%
31%
29%
7%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
PUBLIC	ADMIN JUDICIARY ACADEMIC LEGAL	PRACTICE
N=15 N=14 N=13 N=3
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
Figure 6 – Main career background of Court Members sitting on copyright cases 
18 
 
economic matters. This is consistent with the findings of previous research on the Court’s membership.72 In 
fact, starting with the famous Jacques Rueff,73 economic expertise seems to remain stable among members 
of the ECJ. 
Although our data is derived only from the Court members involved in copyright cases, the size of the 
sample gives an indication of the general composition of the European Court of Justice, and findings appear 
to be in line with previous research. It seems that the prevalence of academic, judiciary and public 
administration background still holds, despite considerable enlargement of the EU and despite the resulting 
growing membership of the Court. A European/Public legal background is still paramount within the Court, 
while specialised subject-matters such as employment law and intellectual property law could not be 
identified in any of the examined professional profiles.  
One variation to previous research relates to the movement in personnel between international/European 
courts and other European institutions. Provenance from the European Court of Human Rights or from 
other European institutions seems to be more relevant now than in the past. This is arguably due the 
increasing number of courts, of courts’ members, and more generally of personnel within the EU 
institutions. An arguable consequence of this ‘internal circulation’ might be that professional backgrounds 
remain anchored to EU/Public administration competences rather than the specialised competences that 
would be more in line with the current jurisdiction of the Court. 
In conclusion, the analysis shows that the composition of the Court did not dramatically change from its 
inception. It is still shaped by high ranking professionals often combining an academic career with juridical 
practice and governmental appointments. These preliminary findings suggest that concerns about the 
independence of the Court have not substantially been addressed by the reform of the Statutes of the 
Court, as the profiles of former public administrators are still dominant among the judges.74 However, the 
most important finding for the purposes of this study relates to the range of expertise that the Court can 
use. Relevant gaps have been identified, including but not limited to copyright law. 
Relating these findings to the analysis of case allocation in the previous section shows that there is no 
obvious reason for the assignment of copyright cases to a specific Reporting Judge or Advocate General, 
because not one of the examined profiles indicates a particular prior expertise in copyright law. Judge 
Malenovský, for example, who is the dominant Reporting Judge in copyright cases is a university professor 
of International, European, and Public Law. He was also a judge of the Czech Constitutional Court, who 
worked for his national Ministry of Foreign affairs and was sent to the EU Council in this capacity (he was 
President of the Committee of Ministers’ Deputies) before being appointed as a judge of the ECJ. Judge 
Lenaerts who dominates database right jurisprudence was also a professor of Public and European law in 
Belgium, and joined the ECJ from the Court of First Instance, whereas judge Arestis was mainly a judge in 
his native country (Greece). Among the recurring AGs in copyright cases, Eleonor Sharpston (UK) has a 
background in economics, language and law. She is a barrister and former academic in EC and comparative 
law, and was legal secretary (référendaire) at the ECJ before becoming a judge. AG Verica Trstenjak 
(Slovenia), who left the court in 2012, is a Private Law professor who covered high posts within her home 
government before being appointed as a member of the Court. 
In summary, the combined findings from the allocation of cases and the analysis of biographical 
backgrounds suggest that the workings of the Court of Justice rely on a mechanism for judicial learning (by 
repeat assignment of case types to the same professionals). However, there appears to be no procedure for 
passing on this expertise. The development of subject specific jurisprudence may be set back periodically, 
as members join the Court as non-experts, and leave the Court with their acquired expertise.  
                                                     
72
 Kelley n 66 above, 107. 
73
 Jacques Rueff (1896-1978) French Prime Minister and Minister of Finances, among other government 
appointments and a brilliant academic career in economics and finance, was a member of the ECJ (formerly ECSC) 
from 1952 to 1962. 
74
 The Comité 255 is active only since 2010. Further research is therefore needed to ascertain this point. 
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In order to explore this potential tension further, we next investigate specific patterns of legal reasoning 
that may be linked to judges and outcomes. 
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EMPIRICAL STUDY II: CONTENT ANALYSIS 
The legal approaches of the ECJ 
The main focus of academic analysis of the copyright jurisprudence of the ECJ has been on the doctrinal 
substance of the Court’s decisions, rather than on the legal approaches privileged by the Court in its 
reasoning. The legal techniques of the Court have however been analysed in the framework of European 
governance, where some reasons for concern have emerged. The lack of reasoning in the grounds of 
judgment, for example, or insufficient reasoning, has been criticised.75 Moreover, the Court has often been 
accused of judicial activism, over-reaching its powers, and resulting in controversial rulings.76 
Among the minority of scholars who have devoted specific attention to the legal arguments employed by 
the European Court in their context of justification, Joxerramon Bengoetxea’s 1993 study deserves close 
attention.77 In our theoretical context, he provided the first systematic analysis of the legal approaches 
implemented by the Court. To this end, he examined decisions of the Court in which the methodology 
implemented for the interpretation of law was expressly discussed by the judges, and decisions in which 
the Court clearly employed a given approach, without explicitly justifying it.  
Bengoetxea finds that the European Court adopts by and large the same topoi of legal interpretation that 
are recognised by the most advanced legal systems. They can be summarised in linguistic or semiotic 
arguments, contextual or systematic arguments, and teleological or dynamic arguments. Among the 
dynamic arguments Bengoetxea includes the use of topoi peculiar to the European legal framework, such 
as the uniform application of EU law, the effet utile, the principle of supremacy, the direct effect, the 
principle of proportionality, etc.78 Finally, in the absence of an exhaustive normative system it becomes 
important for the Court to recur to its own case-law both as a topos and as a normative source.79 
More recently, another exhaustive review of the legal approaches employed by the European Court has 
been carried out by Gunnar Beck. As Bengoetxea, he finds that the legal arguments or topoi employed by 
the ECJ in its legal reasoning are those recognised by most advanced legal systems. He critically assesses 
the choices of the Court in matters of legal interpretation, and tests the critique according to which the 
European judges cumulatively use a number of legal approaches, without a hierarchical order. In essence, 
he finds that on the one hand the occurrence of this latter attitude of the Court is mostly justified, and on 
the other hand the impact of this approach on the jurisprudence of the Court should not be exaggerated.80 
The cumulative method of the Court represents a departure from the three-step approach theorised by 
McCormick and Summers.81 According to their theory, courts should address legal cases in three steps. The 
first step involves an exam of the text of the law in search of a legal meaning that clearly applies to the 
factual situation (semiotic argument). This legal analysis involves to some extent contextual analysis, 
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intended as the analysis of the literal context in which the letter of the law is framed. In the case of EU 
directives, for example, this would involve an analysis of the recitals of the directive, in order to provide 
clarifications on the meaning of the text. This is mostly sufficient in the grounds for judgment when a case 
is clear.82 But for most cases, when the text of the law does not suffice to provide a solution, other 
arguments have to be called upon.  
Step two therefore involves a systematic or contextual interpretation, which goes beyond the semantic 
context of the legal text. Historical considerations (for example, preparatory works for a directive), 
economic considerations (for example, advantages or disadvantages for the internal market), contextual 
legislative frameworks (for example other directives, international treaties, fundamental principles of law) 
are called into play. Step three, finally, involves a purposive or teleological reading of the law, which takes 
into account the intention of the legislator, as deduced from the above sources. Step three is seen by some 
as a potentially risky approach because involves a larger amount of discretion by the judge. Therefore, 
according to these commentators, step three should be called into play only when the first two steps did 
not help with the interpretation of the legal text.83 
Critics of the cumulative approach of the Court reproach the European judiciary for favouring purposive 
interpretation over semantic techniques in order to foster European integration.84 Beck admits this attitude 
of the Court, but he argues that this ‘communautaire flavour’ find its origin not only in the Courts judicial 
activism but also in the legal uncertainty of European law.85 Moreover, he argues, the occurrence of such 
attitude in the European jurisprudence is not evenly employed but depends on subject areas.86 
Finally, Beck suggests that the legal reasoning of the Court is less constrained than that of other high courts, 
but he ascribes this to the peculiar nature of the European judiciary. On the one hand a multilingual and 
multi-governmental legal system offers more uncertainty over literal interpretations and historical 
interpretations (instrumental to understand the ‘intention’ of the legislator’87); and on the other hand, as in 
most legal systems, there is no hierarchical order of the topoi88 to be employed in the legal justifications, 
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hence the relevant amount of discretion that the Court enjoys in its reasoning.89 This is how other extra-
legal ‘steadying factors’ enter the determination of the Court’s judgments. While the topoi relate to the 
context of justification of a judgment, the ‘steadying factors’ relate to the context of discovery. These are 
political, social, psychological factors that impact on the decision, because they ultimately determine the 
weight that is given to each topos, and are much more volatile and difficult to assess.90 
Applying this theoretical approach to the ECJ’s copyright jurisprudence, we classified patterns of reasoning 
into semantic, systematic, and teleological by each textual occurrence suggesting the implementation of a 
given legal technique. This content analysis produces variables that, through statistical analysis, capture the 
prevailing approaches of the Court and may predict relationships between these and the outcome of the 
case. 
 
Analysis and findings 
Semantic, Systematic or Teleological? 
In each case before the Court of Justice, discussion starts with a reference to the letter of the relevant 
legislation. In fact, the Court has expressly declared the importance of this approach by stating that the 
judges cannot ‘interpret a provision in a manner contrary to its express wording’.91 The semantic approach 
therefore occurs in all cases of the sample. The content analysis also codes references to the recitals of the 
cited directives, which we consider as part of the semantic approach because they are instrumental to 
clarifying the text of the law. However, if the text of the recitals suggested a wider approach, the recitals 
were coded accordingly.92 Evidence of a semantic approach was indicated by references to particular words 
or expressions, for example in their different linguistic translation, or accompanied by a discussion on 
differences in meaning. This evidence was considered in relation to other approaches in order to determine 
its significance.  
‘Systematic’ (or ‘contextual’) coding was applied whenever one or more contextual factors were called into 
play to support a given interpretation of a piece of European legislation. In these cases reference was made 
for example to international legislation, to the legislative history of the legal text, to other EU legislation 
(normally EU directives), to legal philosophy arguments, or to economic factors (impact on competition or 
on the internal market). The ‘systematic’ code was also applied to logical arguments (a contrario, a fortiori, 
a pari, by analogy) and hierarchical arguments (lex specialis, lex generalis, etc.) traditionally utilised in legal 
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reasoning, because these arguments are normally recalled with reference to other legal sources (law or 
case-law), which are part of the context in which the piece of EU legislation is examined.93 
The analysis shows that the recourse to systematic/contextual arguments was made by Advocates General 
much more often than by judges in the Grounds for Judgment. Mostly the reference was made to the 
legislative history of the examined piece of legislation (e.g. preparatory works of directives). However, very 
often the legal interpretation of European law was underpinned by the norms of international treaties 
(TRIPS, Berne convention, WTO Treaties, HR Convention and Charter). Less frequently, the examined cases 
included reference to other EU directives or to economic considerations (favourable or unfavourable 
impact on the Internal Market). Philosophical considerations in our sample were rare.  
A tentative explanation for this prevalence of systematic arguments in the Opinions compared to the 
Judgments can be suggested by the institutional role of the Advocate General, who is charged to provide 
the most comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the case.94 
‘Teleological’ or purposive coding refers to dynamic95 approaches where the Court textually refers to the 
aim or objective (or equivalent wording) of the piece of EU legislation that it is called to interpret. For 
example wording such as: ‘First of all, it is to be noted that the principal objective of Directive ... is to 
establish...’ or ‘it is clear ... that the legislature intended...’ will be coded as ‘teleological’. Teleological 
justifications were mostly recalled in order to assist in the interpretation of European directives, but in a 
few occurrences they were also employed to explain the reference to international treaties and to 
international sources of Human Rights law.96 
In addition, we have applied the ‘teleological’ code to parts of text in which the Court implemented specific 
approaches peculiar to the EU system such as the effet utile doctrine, the proportionality principle, the 
uniform application of the EU law, etc.97 Peculiar EU approaches lean towards teleological (dynamic) 
reasoning more than traditional and ‘orthodox’ interpretative techniques. 
A large majority (eighty-seven per cent) of the judgments referred to the aim of the legislator while arguing 
for a particular legal interpretation of the text. This figure includes also the peculiar approaches of 
European law, which are however much less frequent than the references to the objective of the 
legislation.98 It is important to note that teleological justifications are normally mentioned in addition to 
semantic considerations, and often in addition to systematic/contextual justifications. Interestingly, 
Advocates General recalled the intention of the legislator more often than judges in their rulings, although 
the asymmetry between Opinions and Judgments is here less evident than in the use of systematic 
arguments. Again, this asymmetry could be attributed to the fact that the Advocate General provides a 
more comprehensive analysis of the case.  
Overall, the analysis reveals a prevalence of semantic and teleological approaches over contextual 
approaches, more evident in the Judgments than in the Opinions. This balance, moreover, did not suffer 
extreme variations over the years, neither in the Grounds for Judgment or in the Opinions of the Advocates 
General. Importantly, one occurrence was detected of an explicit argument assessing one of these 
approaches against the other. In the DR case, the Judgment specifies ‘a purely literal interpretation of the 
recital at issue does not, in itself, provide an answer to the question referred since it inevitably results in an 
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outcome which proves to be contra legem’.99 The teleological interpretation of the legal text was therefore 
explicitly preferred to the semantic interpretation. The aim of the legislator, in DR, was also called into play 
to settle the contrast among diverging translations of the directive.100 These are exceptional findings in the 
sample. Mostly, the text of the examined legal cases revealed an implementation of several combined 
approaches (semantic, systematic and teleological), supporting each other.  
 
Reversing vs Consolidating previous Case-Law 
Reference to European case-law is undoubtedly a very important canon of interpretation implemented by 
the European Court. This is normally ascribed to the indeterminate and fragmentary nature of European 
law. Both the above-mentioned studies on the European jurisprudence have recognised the important 
weight of this interpretative approach of the Court.101 Our analysis confirms these findings. 
In most of the cases examined, both within the Grounds of Judgment or the Opinion, reference was made 
to at least a few instances of previous ECJ case-law. Some of these previous rulings were recalled to confirm 
the position of the Court on a point that had already been discussed in another case. Other rulings were 
cited in order to distinguish the factual situation from that of the previous case. ‘Reversal’ coding in our 
analysis was applied to instances of open criticism and distance taken from the Court’s previous case-law, 
whereas every other self-referencing of the Court, intended as citation of previous case-law in support of 
the legal reasoning, was coded as ‘consolidation’. 
In order to assign a ‘reversal’ coding to a case, evidence of an express change of route of the Court was 
required. For example, the landmark case HAG II102 studied by EU intellectual property commentators103 as 
the most obvious example of reversal of the ECJ jurisprudence (reversing HAG I104), includes in its 
documents explicit statements of criticism of the previous case-law, such as: ‘With the benefit of hindsight, 
one can see there were in the previous case law signs of an unduly negative attitude to the value of 
trademarks’105 or ‘one might perhaps have expected to find in the Court’s judgment in HAG I a detailed, 
convincing statement of the reasons that led it to give birth to this new principle of Community law. But 
that is not the case.’106 
In our sample, the Court cites on average almost seven other cases in each judgment. We found hardly any 
case in which no reference107 was made to previous case-law. At the other extreme, in one case 28 other 
cases were cited.108 The self-referencing attitude of the Court in copyright cases appears very strong, with 
312 previous cases of the ECJ cited within the 49 cases object of our study. Of these, only one instance of 
‘reversal’ was found, in an Opinion of an Advocate General which did not specifically pertain to copyright 
law. It was the Advocate General Trstenjak in Painer who argued: ‘In the light of the criticism of the Court’s 
previous case-law, which I consider to be justified, I suggest that a slightly modified criterion be applied in 
examining whether there is a sufficiently close connection for the purposes of Article 6(1) of Regulation No 
44/2001’.109 This instance, albeit interesting, does not bear on copyright subject-matter. The content 
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analysis of the documents object of our study, therefore, did not reveal any explicitly expressed reversal in 
the Court’s case-law on copyright. 
 
Broad vs Narrow concepts and broadening the rights of the copyright owner 
In every examined preliminary ruling the discussion involves the definition of key concepts, such as for 
example ‘reproduction right’ or ‘international exhaustion’. These concepts in our content analysis have 
been identified and coded as ‘broad’ or ‘narrow’ according to whether the Court stated, directly or 
indirectly, that the interpretation to be given to the concept at hand was broad or narrow. Examples of a 
direct statement include the use of the words ‘broad’ or ‘narrow’ in the coded text. Examples of indirect 
broad definition of a concept involve the expansion of the concept at hand, which is stated ‘including’ 
further categories of items.110 It needs to be recalled that this is textual content analysis, not legal analysis, 
therefore instances of ‘broad’ interpretations will be picked up by the coding even though their use by the 
Court may be merely rhetorical.111 
This analysis will give indications on the approaches of the Court only when combined with the object of 
the legal issue to which the concept is related. For example, the concept of ‘reproduction right’ can give 
useful indications on the approach of the Court only if we consider that this is one of the main entitlements 
of the copyright owner. A broad interpretation of such a concept would broaden the rights of the owner, 
whereas a narrow interpretation of the same concept would somewhat constrain copyright protection. 
Conversely, a broad interpretation of copyright limits and exceptions would constrain the entitlements of 
the owner, whereas a narrow interpretation would reinforce them. 
The copyright literature has suggested that the Court normally gives a broad interpretation of the rights of 
the owners and a narrow interpretation of copyright exceptions and limitations. This general approach on 
copyright derives from a number of Recitals of Directive 29/2001/EC112 (hereinafter, the InfoSoc Directive), 
which requires a ‘high level of protection to the author’ and narrow boundaries for copyright exceptions.113 
Broad or narrow interpretation of concepts therefore should normally be grounded on the specific text of a 
directive114 and should be determined by the piece of legislation that the Court is called to interpret. 
However the analysis of our data reveals quite a different picture. Just over half of the examined judgments 
called to interpret the rights of the owner gave a broad interpretation, and only little more than half of the 
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rulings involving copyright limits displayed a narrow construct. In essence, the analysis suggests that the 
high protection of the copyright owner, or the narrow construction of copyright limits, do not guide the 
copyright jurisprudence of the Court as one might have expected.  
This finding however must be understood in context, i.e. the nature of the main copyright issues discussed 
in each case. Almost half of the examined cases involved a copyright issue stemming from the InfoSoc 
Directive whereas the other half of the sample discussed entitlements of copyright owners related to 
copyright, such as broadcasting rights, rental rights, and resale rights, copyright enforcement, software 
protection and copyright term. The ‘high protection’ for the copyright owner is cited only by the Infosoc 
directive. Therefore, a substantial difference could be expected between the protection of the author 
under this directive and the protection of rightholders under the other directives. In fact, our data reveals 
that the difference is modest. The rights of the owner are expanded115 in fifty-six per cent of the cases 
stemming from the InfoSoc directive and in forty-five per cent of case stemming from the other directives. 
Nine out of twelve cases discussing the rights of the owner under the InfoSoc directive were interpreted 
broadly,116 while half of the cases regarding copyright exceptions and limits were construed narrowly.117 
Across the whole sample, an interesting example is the concept of ‘communication to the public’. This 
concept was indeed recalled under a number of circumstances related to copyright, to resale rights, and to 
broadcasting rights. The data suggest that the European judges initially revealed a strict attitude in relation 
to the concept of communication to the public, with relation to a retransmission of a radio signal in hotel 
rooms. In SGAE the Court, against the opinion of Advocate General La Pergola, excluded the application of 
the broadcasting directive and referred the case to national legislation. No other directive was in force at 
the time to offer a solution of this case.118A few years later, after the entry into force of the InfoSoc 
directive, the Court gave another reading of the same factual case by giving a broad interpretation of the 
concept of communication to the public. The Operational part of the Judgment in Egeda stated: ‘the 
distribution of a signal by means of television sets by a hotel to customers staying in its rooms, whatever 
technique is used to transmit the signal, constitutes communication to the public within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of that directive.’119 The judges also specified: ‘It follows from the 23rd recital in the preamble to 
Directive 2001/29 that ‘communication to the public’ must be interpreted broadly’.120 
This approach was also followed with reference to a retransmission of a TV signal from one Member State 
to another121 and in relation to the broadcasting of a TV signal in a pub.122 On each occasion the court held 
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that a new public was given access to the copyright work and that a communication to the public occurred. 
That latter concept was therefore interpreted broadly. However, the Court appears to change this attitude 
when it ruled on the retransmission of a radio signal in a dentist practice.123 No new communication to the 
public took place, as there was no aim to obtain a profit and only a limited number of persons had access to 
the copyright work (as if the Court introduced a kind of de minimis rule). The Court reverses its attitude 
again when ruling on the retransmission of a signal in hotel rooms, by applying a broad construct, arguably 
because a profit was once again sought and because a broader audience was involved.124 The Court inverts 
again when ruling on the communication of a work in a place open to the public, by adopting a narrow 
stance.125 Finally, the broad approach reappears when the judges rule on the retransmission of TV shows 
via the Internet126 and on the broadcasting of TV signals in spa hotel rooms,127 only to disappear again when 
the case concerned internet links on a web page.128 What is interesting to note is that the changes in the 
approach of the Court do not depend on whether or not the communication rights stems from the InfoSoc 
Directive, and it does not depend on the legal approaches applied to these cases either. According to our 
data, all the above cases are grounded on a semantic interpretation of the law, confirmed by a teleological 
interpretation (in all cases) and by a systematic interpretation (in most cases). The Court seems to operate 
a broad concept of communication to the public, but this concept is applied in a balanced way, taking into 
account various factors relating to the facts of the case.  
Finally, a certain consistency has to be reported on the approach used by the ECJ in cases regarding 
copyright enforcement, software protection, and term protection, although the small size of the sample on 
these subject-matters does not allow any conclusive findings. In the matter of enforcement, four cases are 
included in our sample. In two cases the rightholder has asked the Court to approve, by preliminary ruling, 
the imposition of filtering devices to Internet Service Providers in order to detect copyright infringement. In 
these two cases the Court refused to give a positive answer underpinning its arguments with the protection 
of fundamental rights.129 In another two cases, although not excluding the possibility for a national court to 
issue an order to release personal data in civil proceedings for copyright infringement, the Court invited the 
national judiciary to balance the interests at stake with fundamental rights (protection of personal data and 
privacy) and to respect the principle of proportionality.130 The protection of fundamental rights in relation 
to copyright users therefore seems to find shelter under the aegis of the Court. 
On the matter of software, the sample includes three cases, relating respectively to the object of 
protection, to the exception for decompilation, and to the exhaustion of rights. Here the attitude of the 
Court seems to be somewhat opposite to what it is expected in the field of copyright protection. The right 
of the owner (object of protection) relating to the graphic user interface of a computer software131 was 
construed narrowly. Conversely, an exception to copyright (decompilation) 132  and a limitation 
(exhaustion)133 were construed broadly.   
On the copyright term, finally, the data included two examples of cases in which the copyright protection 
was revived thanks to a number of EU directives. Although copyright term should be in principle a limit to 
copyright protection (by limiting in time the entitlements of the copyright owners), several pieces of 
legislation extending copyright protection, first to copyright than to related rights, have in effect expanded 
the strength of copyright protection. On this subject the Court has implemented a broad approach, by 
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conferring copyright protection to works previously not protected 134  (or no longer protected) by 
copyright.135 
The above findings in the matter of enforcement, software and copyright term can give only indications of 
the approaches of the Court on a given subject matter, due to the small size of the sample. 
 
Judges vs Advocates General 
The analysis of forty cases involving copyright and related rights revealed sometimes a tension between the 
Opinions of the Advocates General and the text of the Judgments. In seven of the examined cases the 
Advocate General interpreted the main issue in a way contrasting to the interpretation of the judges. When 
the judges had given a broad interpretation to the main issue, the AG had proposed a narrow 
interpretation and vice versa. The copyright issues on which these divergences took place are: 
communication to the public (three cases), equitable remuneration for broadcasting (two cases), fair 
compensation (one case), and exhaustion relating to software (one case). Interestingly, the combination of 
reporting judges and advocates general, in these seven cases, is always different. 
In VG Wort, the reading of Article 5(2)(a) of Directive 2001/29/EC by Advocate General Sharpston diverged 
from the interpretation of the Court because she found that ‘reproduction on paper or any similar medium’ 
referred only to ‘reproductions on analogue originals’, whereas for the judges this wording referred also to 
‘reproductions effected using a printer and a personal computer’. The concept of reproduction was 
therefore interpreted restrictively by AG Sharpston and broadly by the Court, although they both 
implemented the same legal topoi (semantic, contextual and teleological) to reach their respective 
conclusions. In UsedSoft, according to Advocate General Bot the subsequent purchaser of a computer 
software cannot rely on the exhaustion of the distribution right of the owner, whereas the Court disagreed. 
Both the AG and the Court argued for the same teleological interpretation of the principle of exhaustion,136 
but they reached opposite conclusions. In Lagardére and SENA, two of the first cases related to 
neighbouring rights, the Court and the AGs reached different conclusions on the equitable remuneration in 
Rental and Lending Rights while both employing teleological arguments.137 
On the apparently thorny issue of communication to the public, three cases are available with a contrast 
between the opinion of the AG and the ruling of the Court. While Advocate General La Pergola in Egeda 
tried to convince the Court, without success, that broadcasting a signal in hotel rooms amounted to a 
‘communication to the public’,138 few years and a directive later (the InfoSoc Directive) AG Sharpston used 
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the same arguments, repeatedly citing La Pergola, to convince the judges of the same point, with a 
different outcome.139 
Another divergence between AGs and judges is revealed by the analysis of the joint cases Football 
Association and Murphy, where both Opinion and Judgment reached the same result, by allowing Ms 
Murphy to use a Greek card in a British decoder, through two diverging tortuous paths.140 While both AG 
and Court gave a broad construction of the concept of ‘reproduction’,141 AG Kokott did not see in the 
factual situation a ‘communication to the public’142 or an act of ‘transient reproduction’,143 whereas the 
Court did.144 Both appealed to teleological, systematic, and semantic arguments to prove their points. 
Finally, the broadcasting of a radio signal in a dentist practice was not considered an act of communication 
to the public in SCF, despite the efforts of AG Trstenjak, who utilised the argument of the ‘spirit and 
purpose’ of directive 2006/115/EC145 to support broad protection for right holders, while the Court 
distinguished between the objectives of this directive and the objectives of the InfoSoc directive to argue 
for a narrow construct of the concept of communication to the public.146 
 
Court members and their approach 
Judge Jiri Malenovský was the reporting judge in 24 of the 40 cases relating to copyright and related 
subject-matter (excluding database right). It is interesting therefore to compare his approach to that of the 
other reporting judges. Judge Malenovský seems to broaden the rights of the owner much more sparingly 
than his colleagues, by applying comparatively less often a broad interpretation of the rights and a narrow 
interpretation of the exceptions. The data suggest that he makes less use of teleological interpretation 
compared to the others and substantially more use of systematic approaches. Other judges such as Arestis 
and Puissochet clearly show higher favour towards rightholders, although they use different arguments, 
prompted by different case subject matter. Judge Arestis often argues for free competition, because half of 
his cases relate to software, whereas Judge Puissochet, who was in post before the InfoSoc directive 
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entered in force, mostly argues for harmonisation of European law. In essence, therefore, Judge 
Malenovský shows a more conservative attitude in the legal interpretation of copyright law while 
constructing the rights of the owner quite narrowly. At the same time, he shows the same recurrence of 
disagreement with Advocates General compared to his colleagues. 
Among the Advocates General, it is interesting to note that the two prevalent members in copyright cases, 
AG Tristenjak and AG Sharpston have a surprisingly similar approach. They both (and to the same extent) 
tend to favour the rightholder less than their colleagues and they both implement (to the same extent) the 
argument of the ‘high protection’ for the copyright holder more often than their colleagues. Among the 
latter, at least two deserve to be cited: AG Jaaskinen who has advised in favour of rightholders in all his 
cases, and AG Bot who consistently expressed opinions against the rightholder in his software-related 
cases.The first used arguments for free competition, overcoming legal uncertainty, and high protection of 
the author, to the same extent. The second argued for competition, harmonisation and, to a lesser extent, 
fair balance of rights. 
 
Database rights 
Within the framework of this study, a separate dataset was collected of nine cases relating to the sui 
generis database rights,147 which was examined with the same approach applied to copyright case-law. The 
sample was analysed separately in order to avoid distortions of the findings caused by a type of entitlement 
(the sui generis rights) which, albeit closely related to copyright, retains its own characteristics and 
peculiarities.  
Cases on the sui generis rights discuss mostly the scope of database protection, including the definition of 
concepts such as ‘extraction’, ‘re-utilization’, ‘investment’ and ‘substantial part’. A few differences can be 
detected between the approaches to database rights and to copyright. First, there is hardly any reference 
in the ruling to the history of the legislation, whereas in all examined cases there is a reference to the 
objective of the legislation. Further, interpretation of European law in the light of international legislation is 
much less recurrent in database cases than in copyright cases (unsurprisingly, since the database right is a 
European creation). Moreover, the self-referencing of the Court, captured as the average of citations of 
previous European case-law, is much weaker in database case-law than in copyright case-law. Finally, a 
rather interesting finding reveals virtually no conflict on database rights between the position of the judges 
and the opinion of the Advocate General.148 Overall, the share of cases related to database protection that 
are ruled in favour of the owner resembles the share of cases stemming from the InfoSoc Directive, and is 
therefore higher than the share of pro-rightholder case-law linked to other directives. 
In sum, differences in the implementation of the teleological approach of European judges between the 
rights of the owner of a database and of copyright appear not relevant. On the contrary greater proximity 
can be detected among approaches and outcome of the cases (pro-rightholders) in database cases and in 
copyright cases stemming from the InfoSoc directive, although the database directive does not require a 
‘high protection’ for the owner. 
 
Underpinnings of the legal approaches and impact on the decision 
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A breakdown of the teleological and systematic explanatory variables in sub-variables expressing the 
arguments that the Court uses to underpin its approaches also produced interesting findings. In our sample 
of forty copyright cases, twenty-two decisions were perceived to be favouring right holders and eighteen 
decisions were not. 
Arguments justifying a teleological interpretation of the law, when the outcome of the case did not favour 
the copyright holder, involve often promoting a fair balance of rights between copyright holders and users 
(or third parties). Other arguments used in cases ruled against the rightholder are, to a lesser extent: free 
competition or free movements of goods in the Internal Market; fostering technological development; 
harmonisation of European law (often only ‘minimal harmonisation’, which is a counterargument for 
harmonisation); and ‘adequate’ protection for the rightholder. Overcoming legal uncertainty in the Internal 
Market and promoting the circulation and development of culture were also mentioned. 
A teleological interpretation of the Infosoc Directive based on a high protection for copyright holders was 
found in more than one third of cases where the outcome favoured the owner. The harmonisation of 
European law was also called into action to rule in favour of the rightholder, whereas the above mentioned 
arguments (competition, fair balance of rights, overcoming legal uncertainty, and fostering technological 
development) were a minority.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Teleological arguments used by the Court when the outcome of the case favours or 
disfavours Copyright owner 
 
These arguments, often literally drawn from the recitals of the interpreted directives (‘high protection’ 
from the 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc) directive, ‘fair balance’ from 2001/29/EC (InfoSoc) directive and 93/83/EEC 
(Satellite and Cable) directive, ‘minimal harmonization’ from the 92/100/EEC (Rental) directive, etc.) may 
be merely rhetorical. In fact, they are put forward to underpin a teleological interpretation both in cases 
favourable and unfavourable to copyright owners. However, the findings show a clear distinction between 
arguments ‘pro-rightholder’ and arguments ‘pro-user’, the presence of which in the legal discourse of the 
Courtmay provide indications of the final outcome of the case. 
32 
 
The comparison between the rulings of the Court where Judge Malenovský is the Reporting Judge and the 
rulings where the Reporting Judge is another Court Member offers some interesting insights. The large 
number of copyright cases reported by Judge Malenovský suggests the acquisition of subject-specific 
experience in these matters. The content analysis of Malenovský decisions reveals the use of the 
teleological argument of the ‘high level of protection for the copyright holders’ required by the InfoSoc 
directive, also in cases (six per cent) whose outcome is not favourable to the rights holder; whereas all the 
other judges use this argument only in cases whose outcome favours the rights holder.  
Also, the argument of the ‘fair balance of rights’, which is used by other judges solely to rule against the 
copyright holders, is employed by Malenovský both in cases whose outcome favours and disfavours the 
right holder. While the small size of the sample suggests caution in interpreting these data, Malenovský 
appears to see the balance between the rights and interests of copyright holders and users of protected 
subject matter as a more central issue than other judges. He also uses a greater range of copyright specific 
arguments rather than focussing on harmonization. 
 
Figure 9 – The approach of Reporting Judge Malenovský 
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Figure 10 – The approach of the other Reporting Judges (without Malenovský) 
 
In summary, among the legal approaches applied by the Court, the analysis confirms a preference for 
teleological and dynamic rather than systematic arguments,149 although the recourse to traditional topoi is 
far larger than the implementation of particularly European canons (effet utile, proportionality, etc.). 
However, overall the data suggest a sophisticated approach of the Court on copyright matters, in line 
perhaps with the ‘rule of reason’ theorised by some commentators, which involves a balancing between 
the rights codified in European law and community interests, in an attempt to develop both coherence and 
integration in the European jurisdiction.150 
On the entitlements of copyright owners and users, the analysis provides a chiaroscuro of broad and 
narrow interpretations of rights and exceptions, which reveals a complex picture of European copyright 
jurisprudence beyond claims of copyright overprotection. Narrow constructions of the rights of the owner 
are at least as frequent as broad constructions. They often occur on similar copyright issues, and may be 
based on similar arguments, such as the high protection of copyright holders recommended in recitals (4) 
and (9) of the InfoSoc directive. The Court in fact seems to strive to balance the latter principle with other 
considerations.  
An analysis of the arguments used by the Court to justify their rulings, citing the ‘intention of the legislator’, 
reveals interesting cues about what these other considerations might be. ‘Fair balance’ of rights and 
interests is argued in many cases with an unfavourable outcome for the rightholder, together with free 
competition, fostering technological development, ‘adequate’ protection of rightholder, and ‘minimal 
harmonization’. Copyright harmonization is instead favoured by pro-rightholder rulings, surpassed only by 
the ‘high protection for the copyright holder’. The data analysis shows a significant impact of the latter 
argument on the outcome of the case, which is (with one exception only151) unfavourable to the 
rightholder. 
A further difference in approach can be observed between copyright cases stemming from the InfoSoc 
directive and cases on copyright-related rights (stemming from other directives). While the former reveal a 
higher probability of a favourable outcome for the rightholder (although maybe not as high as one could 
expect from the recitals of that directive), the latter feature a higher predictability and consistency in the 
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approach. For example, cases of software protection or exhaustion of rights invariably prompt competition 
arguments (and are ruled against the owner) whereas rental and lending rights are often solved by shifting 
the decision to Member States, in the name of ‘minimal harmonization’. 
However, on more nuanced issues such as the right of communication to the public or, more generally, 
rights or exceptions stemming from the InfoSoc directive, approach patterns are more volatile. As the 
recent rulings OSA and Svensson show, the same argument (high protection for the author) and the same 
approach (teleological) on the same concept (communication to the public from the InfoSoc directive) can 
lead to opposite outcomes. This suggests on the one hand that when the legislation is clearly formulated 
the impact of subject-specific knowledge (or lack of it) on the ruling is contained. On the other hand it 
might also suggest that when the subject-matter is more difficult to define, or more controversial, subject-
specific knowledge is essential. This is confirmed by the analysis of the relationships between the 
approaches and court members. Those that have developed within the Court a relatively larger domain 
expertise issue more balanced rulings or opinions, while developing a larger array of arguments. The 
balance between copyright owners and users is in fact a more subtle but more important overarching 
principle of copyright law than ‘high protection’ for rightholders.  
Striving for balance is certainly an essential quality for a court. At least, the data show that the ECJ is not 
biased either towards or against rightholders, as its judgments appear to be distributed between the two 
outcomes.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We set out to investigate how the Court of Justice of the European Union has dealt with copyright cases 
against the backdrop of a dramatic and controversial increase in such cases during the last decade. We 
empirically investigated two claims: (i) that the Court has failed to develop a coherent copyright 
jurisprudence (lacking domain expertise, copyright specific reasoning, and predictability); (ii) that the Court 
has pursued an activist, harmonising agenda (resorting to teleological interpretation of European law). 
Our two empirical studies introduced various measures to assess each of these claims. To investigate the 
suspected lack of a coherent copyright jurisprudence we sought to identify specific pre-existing judicial 
expertise in the area of copyright and related rights. This can be derived from the biographical data about 
members of the court that are in the public domain. We found that the members of the European Court of 
Justice are mainly ex-academics, civil servants, judges, or all of these things. They have mostly a background 
in European Law or Public Law. While some subject-specific competences (criminal matters, family law, 
competition and commercial law) are slowly entering the European Court, not all areas are covered. There 
are no specialists in copyright law, despite the increasing workload of the Court on these matters. 
The Court appears to compensate for this lack of specialisation by a subject-specific distribution of the 
workload among court members, enabling ‘judicial learning’. When testing the allocation of cases to 
Chambers, Reporting Judges and Advocates General we concluded that the observed pattern of repeat 
allocations is statistically highly significant, and can only be explained by a deliberate policy by the Court to 
overcome this lack of pre-existing expertise through the creation of de facto specialist chambers. 
A further measure for a lack of a coherent jurisprudence may be provided by the identification of 
unpredictable patterns of reasoning. For example, our content analysis suggests that despite different 
outcomes in the interpretation of the concept of ‘communication to the public’, according to our data, all 
the above cases are grounded on a semantic interpretation of the law, confirmed by a teleological 
interpretation and by a systematic interpretation. When applying quantitative content analysis to the use 
of arguments within topoi, we find that the reasoning of the dominant copyright judge Malenovský 
(rapporteur in twenty-four of forty copyright cases) differs from that of the other judges. This may be an 
indicator of judicial learning. We acknowledge as a limitation that this finding reflects descriptive statistics 
on a small sample. However, the same pattern on a larger sample would be significant. 
35 
 
We now turn to the second claim, that the Court has pursued an activist, upwardly harmonising agenda. 
Measures or indications for such an agenda included the possible prevalence of a teleological 
interpretation of European law which we sought to capture again through the content analysis of all 
copyright judgments (the data sample). The data show indeed a clear prevalence of teleological topoi, but 
this finding is tempered by the presence of complex patterns of accumulation (e.g. cumulative use of 
several approaches without a hierarchical order). This points rather to a more complex explanation, 
supported by the finding that the outcomes of the judgments do not (systematically) expand copyright 
protection. 
The following table summarises the measures we developed to explore our initial hypotheses: 
Hypothesis Measure Data Findings 
ECJ lacks coherent 
copyright jurisprudence 
1) Judges and AGs do not 
have specialist expertise 
Biographical background 
(descriptive statistics) 
Confirmed: no prior 
domain expertise 
 
 2) There are no specialist 
chambers 
Allocation of cases to 
Chambers, Reporting 
Judges and AGs (tested for 
significance) 
Rejected: repeat 
allocations can only be 
explained by deliberate 
policy 
 3) Reasoning is 
unpredictable 
 
Content analysis, linking 
judicial approaches to 
outcomes 
 
Confirmed, but different 
approaches found for 
different judges (not 
conclusive: small sample 
limitation) 
ECJ pursues activist, 
upwardly harmonising 
agenda 
1) There is a prevalence of 
teleological topoi 
Content analysis, 
identifying patterns of 
reasoning 
 
Confirmed, but complex 
pattern of cumulation, 
often combining 
teleological, systematic and 
semantic 
 2) Outcome of judgments 
expand copyright 
protection 
Content analysis of 
outcomes 
Rejected 
Table 1 – Hypotheses, Measures, Data and Findings 
 
In answer to the question posed in the title of this article, ‘Is there a EU copyright jurisprudence?’ our 
findings paint an intriguing picture. We have identified attempts to create in effect specialist chambers, and 
we found recurrent patterns of reasoning, but outcomes from that reasoning remain unpredictable, more 
so for the less experienced members of the Court. So the empirical analysis seems to suggest that while the 
Court’s jurisprudence is in better shape than critiques suggest, much could be done to improve its 
legitimacy. 
Having diagnosed the state of copyright related judicial reasoning at the ECJ, what policy interventions 
would assist the Court to form a more coherent copyright jurisprudence? The most straightforward 
solution might introduce specialised (copyright or intellectual property) professionals into the European 
Court system in order to increase domain competence and predictability. Short of forming a specialist 
Court, interventions might include (i) reforming the rules of procedure by making criteria for the 
assignment of cases more explicit (enabling the systematic allocation of cases to certain chambers where 
new members might shadow reporting judges that have developed domain specific experience), and (ii) 
supporting judicial learning when members first join the Court (for example through training of 
référendaires in specialist domains). Exploring such options seriously would require the Court (and the 
European institutions that invented its governance) to look in the mirror, hold the gaze and recognise what 
they see. Empirical reflection may yet improve doctrine. 
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APPENDIX I – Sample of Cases
 
  
Case Parties Judgement Chamber Rapporteur AG
COPYRIGHT
C-466/12 SE Svensson and others 13/02/2014 Fourth Malenovsky Sharpston
C‑351/12 CZ OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s.27/02/2014 Fourth Prechal Sharpston
C-355/12 IT Nintendo e.a. 23/01/2014 Fourth Safjan  Sharpston
2012 3
C‑607/11 UK ITV Broadcasting 07/03/2013 Fourth Malenovsky Bot 
C-457/11 DE VG Wort 27/06/2013 Fourth Malenovsky Sharpston
C-5/11 DE Donner 21/06/2012 Fourth Schiemann Jääskinen 
C‑128/11 DE UsedSoft 03/07/2012 Grand Lenaerts Bot 
C-521/11 AT Amazon.com 11/07/2013 Second Silva de Lapuerta Mengozzi
2011 5
C‑406/10 UK SAS Institute 02/05/2012 Grand Arestis Bot
C-510/10 DK DR and TV2 Danmark 26/04/2012 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑360/10 BE SABAM 16/02/2012 Third Malenovský Cruz Villalón 
C‑283/10 RO Circul Globus Bucureşti 24/11/2011 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑277/10 AT Luksan 09/02/2012 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑162/10 IE Phonographic Performance 15/03/2012 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑145/10 AT Painer 20/01/2012 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑135/10 IT SCF 15/03/2012 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑70/10 BE Scarlet Extended 24/11/2011 Third Malenovský Cruz Villalón 
C‑271/10 BE VEWA 30/06/2011 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑461/10 SE Bonnier Audio 19/04/2012 Third Malenovský Jääskinen 
2010 11
C‑168/09 IT Flos 27/01/2011 Second Lõhmus Bot 
C‑462/09 NL Stichting de Thuiskopie 16/06/2011 Third Malenovský Jääskinen 
C‑393/09 CZ Bezpečnostní softwarová 22/12/2010 Third Arestis Bot 
C‑431/09 BE Airfield and Canal Digitaal 13/10/2011 Third Malenovský Jääskinen 
2009 4
C‑5/08 DK Infopaq International 16/07/2009 Fourth Malenovský Trstenjak 
C-403/08 C-
429/08 UK
Football Association Premier 
League + Murphy 04/10/2011 Grand Malenovský Kokott 
C-467/08 ES Padawan 21/10/2010 Third Malenovský Trstenjak 
C‑518/08 FR Fundación Gala-Salvador Dalí 15/04/2010 Third Malenovský Sharpston 
2008 4
C‑240/07 DE Sony Music Entertainment 20/01/2009 Grand Arestis Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
2007 1
C‑456/06 DE Peek & Cloppenburg 17/04/2008 Fourth Malenovský Sharpston 
C‑275/06 ES Promusicae 29/01/2008 Grand Malenovský Kokott 
2006 2
C-306/05 ES SGAE 07/12/2006 Third Malenovský Sharpston 
C-169/05 BE Uradex 01/06/2006 Third Malenovský Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer
2005 2
C-479/04 DK Laserdisken 12/09/2006 Grand Arestis Sharpston 
C-192/04 IT Lagardère Active Broadcast 14/07/2005 Third  Malenovský Tizzano 
2004 2
2004-2014
C-245/00 NL SENA 06/02/2003 Sixth  Puissochet Tizzano 
C-293/98 ES Egeda 03/02/2000 Sixth Kapteyn La Pergola 
C-60/98 IT Butterfly Music 29/06/1999 n/a Puissochet Cosmas
C-61/97 DK FDV v. Laserdisken 22/09/1998 n/a Puissochet La Pergola 
C-200/96 DE Metronome Musik 28/04/1998 n/a Puissochet Tesauro
C-92/92 DE Phil Collins 20/10/1993 n/a Grévisse Jacobs
1992-2000 6
TOTAL 40
DATABASE RIGHT
C-202/12 NL Innoweb Fifth von Danwitz Cruz Villalón 
C-173/11 UK Football Dataco e.a. Third Lenaerts Cruz Villalón 
C-604/10 UK Football Dataco e.a. Third Lenaerts  Mengozzi 
C-545/07 BG Apis-Hristovich Fourth Lenaerts Sharpston 
C-304/07 DE Directmedia Publishing Fourth Lenaerts  Sharpston 
C-444/02 GR Fixtures Marketing Grand Lenaerts  Stix-Hackl 
C-338/02 SE Fixtures Marketing Grand Lenaerts  Stix-Hackl 
C-203/02 UK British Horseracing Board Grand Lenaerts  Stix-Hackl 
C-46/02 FI Fixtures Marketing Grand Lenaerts  Stix-Hackl 
TOTAL 9
Sample: ECJ Copyright and Database Right references 1992-2012
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APPENDIX II– Codebook excerpt 
List of codes used for content analysis 
- broad concept: broad interpretation of the main concept or issue that the court is called to 
interpret or define 
- narrow concept: a narrow interpretation of the main concept or issue that the court is called to 
interpret or define 
- outcome: is the outcome of the judgment favourable to right holders or not? 
 
semantic:  
 text of the law interpreted according to its wording. This may also include the context of the 
wording, drawing for example on the recitals of a directive. ‘Context’ here is still related to the 
textual analysis, whereas a larger contextualisation of the norm would involve historical or 
economic considerations. If recitals are cited for objectives, the coding is as teleological. 
systematic/contextual: 
 interpretation in light of international treaties 
 historical (legislative history of the legal text) 
 economic (economic reasons for the provisions) 
 philosophical (mention of legal philosophy arguments to interpret concepts) 
 logic: analogy, a fortiori, a contrario 
 
teleological: 
 interpretation according to the perceived purpose of the legislator 
 approaches specific to the EU (effet utile, uniform application) 
 reasonableness: a contrary interpretation would lead to an aberrant result 
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Examples of coding 
C-466/12 Svensson 
JUDGMENT 
Broad, teleological 
As regards the first of those criteria, that is, the existence of an ‘act of communication’, this must be 
construed broadly (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08 Football Association Premier 
League and Others [2011] ECR I-9083, paragraph 193), in order to ensure, in accordance with, inter alia, 
recitals 4 and 9 in the preamble to Directive 2001/29, a high level of protection for copyright holders (17) 
Teleological 
Recital 7 in the preamble to the directive indicates that the directive does not have the objective of 
removing or preventing differences that do not adversely affect the functioning of the internal market (36) 
Outcome (unfavourable to right holder) 
Main question: ‘… the referring court asks, in essence, whether Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29 must be 
interpreted as meaning that the provision, on a website, of clickable links to protected works available on 
another website constitutes an act of communication to the public as referred to in that provision, where, 
on that other site, the works concerned are freely accessible.’ (14) 
Ruling: ‘Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC … must be interpreted as meaning that the provision on a 
website of clickable links to works freely available on another website does not constitute an ‘act of 
communication to the public’, as referred to in that provision.’ 
 
C-351/12 OSA 
OPINION 
Broad, teleological 
the expression must be interpreted broadly, in such a way as to ensure a high level of protection for right 
holders (27) 
JUDGMENT 
Broad 
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the concept of ‘communication to the public’ in Article 3(1) of that directive must be interpreted broadly, 
as recital 23 in the preamble to the directive indeed expressly states (23) 
Teleological 
the principal objective of Directive 2001/29 is to establish a high level of protection of authors (23) 
EU law 
Questions on the interpretation of EU law referred by a national court in the factual and legislative context 
which that court is responsible for defining, and the accuracy of which is not a matter for the Court to 
determine, enjoy a presumption of relevance (56) 
Outcome (favourable to right holder) 
Main question: ‘Must Directive 2001/29/EC … be interpreted as meaning that an exception disallowing 
remuneration to authors for the communication of their work by television or radio … to patients in rooms 
in a spa establishment which is a business is contrary to Articles 3 and 5 (Article 5(2)(e), (3)(b) and (5))?’ 
Ruling: ‘Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29/EC …must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which 
excludes the right of authors to authorise or prohibit the communication of their works, by a spa 
establishment which is a business, through the intentional distribution of a signal by means of television or 
radio sets in the bedrooms of the establishment’s patients. Article 5(2)(e), (3)(b) and (5) of that directive is 
not such as to affect that interpretation.’ 
 
C-355/12 Nintendo e.a. 
OPINION 
Broad  
On a proper construction of Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, 
‘technological measures’ within the meaning of Article 6 of that directive may include measures 
incorporated not only in protected works themselves but also in devices designed to allow access to those 
works (79,1) 
JUDGMENT 
Broad  
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the concept of an ‘effective technological measure’, for the purposes of Article 6(3) of that directive, is 
capable of covering technological measures comprising, principally, equipping not only the housing system 
containing the protected work, such as the videogame, with a recognition device in order to protect it 
against acts not authorised by the holder of any copyright, but also portable equipment or consoles 
intended to ensure access to those games and their use. (19) 
Teleological 
Such a definition, moreover, complies with the principal objective of Directive 2001/29 which, as is 
apparent from recital 9 thereof, is to establish a high level of protection in favour, in particular, of authors, 
which is crucial to intellectual creation. (27) 
EU/proportionality 
 the examination of that question requires that account be taken of the fact that legal protection against 
acts not authorised by the rightholder of any copyright must respect the principle of proportionality, in 
accordance with Article 6(2) of Directive 2001/29, interpreted in the light of recital 48 thereof, and should 
not prohibit devices or activities which have a commercially significant purpose or use other than to 
circumvent the technical protection. (30) 
Systematic/lex specialis 
Directive 2009/24 constitutes a lex specialis in relation to the provisions of Directive 2001/29 (23) 
 
Outcome (favourable to right holder) 
Main Question: ‘Must Article 6 of Directive 2001/29/EC be interpreted… as meaning that the protection of 
technological protection measures … may also extend to a system… in which a device is installed in the 
hardware which is capable of recognising on a separate housing mechanism containing the protected 
works…’? 
Ruling: ‘for the purposes of Article 6(3) of that directive, is capable of covering technological measures 
comprising, principally, equipping not only the housing system containing the protected work…with a 
recognition device in order to protect it against acts not authorised by the holder of any copyright, but also 
portable equipment or consoles intended to ensure access to those games and their use’. 
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